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Abstract 
This paper examines the use of European Union (EU) structural funds to 
support the development of innovation policy within Wales during the period 
2000-2006. Drawing on data from the Welsh Government and interviews with 
key stakeholders, it focuses specifically on the Technium programme, a high-
profile technology-based innovation intervention that took a predominantly 
supply-side approach to supporting innovation, resulting in its eventual failure. 
Consistent within this is an analysis of the efficacy of supply-side policies using 
EU funds to support research and development activities to aid economic 
growth in peripheral, weaker regions.  
 
Introduction 
There is little doubt that regional innovation policy is a high priority across 
Europe and that with the inception of the smart specialisation approach, 
supporting innovation at the regional level is on the agenda for the foreseeable 
future (Foray, David, and Hall, 2011; European Commission, 2013; McCann 
and Ortega-Argilés, 2015). However, a question mark hangs over the 
effectiveness of regional innovation policy due to the lack of clarity over how 
successful it has been as a vehicle for bringing about regional economic 
development and convergence across the regions of Europe (Koschatsky, 
2009). Going forward, it is critical that policies and interventions deliver positive 
results, especially in a time of austerity and declining public spending across 
Europe. 
 
  
The focus of this paper is a case study analysis of a weaker European region - 
Wales - with a long history of implementing innovation policy and engaging in 
the European Commission (EC)’s efforts to drive convergence across the 
European regions. Specifically, the focus is on the Technium programme, 
which was the largest and most significant innovation initiative implemented 
within Wales since devolution but is now widely regarded as a costly failure. 
Why this is the case and how mistakes can be avoided in the future are the 
research questions at the heart of the paper. The overall aim is to question the 
appropriateness of existing predominant regional innovation policy approaches 
in Europe in the context of weaker regions and to draw lessons from the Wales 
case.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. The first section provides the underpinnings 
in terms of innovation policy and theory. Some explanations are provided of the 
terms and concepts employed, and an overview of how innovation policy has 
evolved in Europe and also the theory alongside it. Following this theoretical 
discussion is the introduction of the Wales case study, which sets the scene for 
the analysis and discussion that follows. This leads to a discussion of the 
interesting lessons and insights that emerge from the failure of the Technium 
programme but which also have a broader relevance to other weaker regions 
and European innovation policy as a whole. The conclusion suggests that a 
technology-based approach to innovation, as advocated through the 
predominant programmes implemented in Wales, may not be wholly 
appropriate in the weaker region setting. Instead, some broadening and 
reconceptualization of innovation policy may be necessary going forward to 
  
increase the efficacy and usefulness of the manner in which public monies are 
being spent. Specifically, more focus on improving human capital and 
supporting regional communities is called for and policy cognisance of private 
sector demand, rather than policy over-supply, is identified as the means with 
which to achieve this.  
Theoretical Underpinnings: Innovation Policy and Theory 
Innovation and its crucial role in driving economic development has become an 
increasingly important area of regional policy. As Bellini and Landabaso (2007 
p. 231) noted, ‘following the Lisbon agenda, there has been a general trend 
towards policy experimentation at the regional level in the field of the economic 
exploitation of knowledge and technological innovation as a means of 
promoting economic growth’. Indeed, four decades of analysis has reshaped 
our understanding of the role innovation plays in economic development and 
has resulted in regional innovation policy finally being accepted into the 
mainstream of public policy today (McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2015) with 
policy makers all over the world realising that regional policies for innovation 
are ‘absolutely necessary in the current international economic scenario’ 
(Cooke and Piccaluga, 2006, p.273).  
 
There are numerous examples from around Europe, and indeed beyond, of 
policies that aim to foster the birth and growth of innovative, high-growth and 
knowledge-based firms. Particularly popular have been policies that develop a 
physical infrastructure to enable this, such as science parks and incubators 
(Diez-Vial and Montoro-Sanchez, 2016; Kautonen et al., 2017). Studies have 
found variable success in these strategies with some considered as examples 
  
of the ‘gold standard’ for successful innovation interventions (Etzkowtiz and 
Klofsten, 2005). On the other hand, the proliferation of these approaches 
across Europe in weaker regions have been described by some as akin to 
‘cathedrals in the desert’ (Morgan, 1997). 
 
In Europe, the idea of regional innovation policy has become something of a 
popular theme which can be traced back to the creation and implementation of 
the Regional Technology Plans, later known as Regional Innovation Strategies 
during the mid 1990s, which required European regions to come up with their 
own approaches to innovation policy (Asheim, 2012; Cooke, 2003). Since then, 
innovation interventions have been pursued across Europe with the financial 
support of the European Structural Funds, in particular the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF). In today’s landscape, innovation remains a priority 
and ‘Smart Specialisation’ – where each region identifies and develops its own 
competitive advantages through a partnership approach involving key actors 
such as local authorities, academia, business spheres and the civil society - is 
the current approach to innovation and regional economic development in 
Europe, and indeed Wales (Foray et al., 2011; Morgan, 2016; Pugh, 2014, 
2017). Indeed, member regions are required to produce Regional Innovation 
Strategies for Smart Specialisation (RIS3) to bring about integrated and place-
based economic transformation (European Commission, 2013;). Convergence 
is one of the principles at the heart of the EC’s work based on the premise of 
narrowing the gap between the wealthiest and poorest regions of the EU and 
regions such as Wales (with less than 75% of the average EU-25 GDP) qualify 
for higher levels of funding to help address this situation. 
  
 
The theoretical construct underpinning the European regional innovation policy 
approach is a systemic conceptualisation of innovation at the regional level. 
Policy has been driven by the belief that regional economic growth is dependent 
upon the creation of successful regional innovation systems (RIS) where 
innovation is an evolutionary, non-linear and interactive process requiring 
intensive communication and co-operation amongst firms, between firms, and 
with other pertinent institutions (Lundvall, 2007). In this context, the institutions 
referred to are both ‘hard’ - encompassing innovation relevant organisations 
such as universities, research institutes, educational institutions, financial 
organisations and government agencies – and ‘soft’, referring to rules, routines 
and norms (Tödtling and Trippl, 2005). As part of this shift in focus, the use of 
European Structural Funds has been of critical importance in operationalizing 
policies geared towards leveraging innovation for economic gains at the 
regional level. 
 
Evidence suggests that regional governments may be required to provide the 
impetus for innovation because regional innovation systems work more 
effectively where there is a higher degree of regional autonomy (Morgan, 2004; 
Cooke, 2013). As well as greater specificity in innovation policy, there is 
evidence that lagging regions need to build up their institutional capacities and 
foster webs of co-operative networks among firms, universities and research 
institutes, financial organisations and governments (Huggins et al, 2012). For 
weaker (and also post-industrial, peripheral, post-communist) regions, the 
difficulties raised by these policy challenges may be even greater (Coenen, 
  
Moodysson & Martin 2014; Blazek & Csank, 2016). As Huggins and Johnston 
(2009) suggest, such regions are uncompetitive due to a lack of strength and 
depth in the very factors that give leading regions their competitive edge such 
as a high density of knowledge-based firms and a networked business culture. 
They are therefore confronted with particular constraints on their ability to 
reconcile these conflicting demands successfully compared to more advanced 
regions (Morgan, 2004). Typically, studies of regional innovation systems have 
focused mainly on regions that have been successful innovators in the past or 
have adapted effectively to economic change, and which offer potential ‘best 
practice’ solutions for policy makers. Consequently, the dynamics of less 
successful places are underdeveloped both in theoretical and policy 
perspectives (Benneworth and Hospers, 2007). The RIS and triple-helix 
approaches to understanding regional innovation suggest that strengthening 
the relationships between government, business and universities is critical to 
improving innovation in lagging regions (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000).  
 
In terms of the business sector within weaker regions, the regional innovation 
paradox (Oughton et al, 2002) results in a situation whereby the more 
innovation is needed to maintain and enhance the economic performance of 
firms in an increasingly global economy, the more difficult it is for them to invest 
effectively and absorb funds for promoting innovation. The problem is explained 
by the institutional characteristics of weaker regions where the system is 
fragmented and lacks either the necessary interfaces and co-operation 
mechanisms for the supply of innovation inputs to match firms’ demand or the 
appropriate conditions for the exploitation of synergies and co-operation among 
  
regional innovation actors (Zhang, Mackenzie, Jones-Evans & Huggins, 2016). 
The capacity to exploit knowledge refers to the capabilities existing within a 
region to commercialise new knowledge and extract value from it, and can be 
seen as the reward for absorbing knowledge. In terms of overall knowledge 
exploitation capacity, weaker regions perform poorly suggesting that there is a 
strong positive relationship between the capacity to exploit and the capacity to 
anchor and diffuse knowledge (NESTA, 2008). 
 
The Welsh context 
 
Wales is a peripheral and weaker region within the European Union and sits on 
the physical edge of the continent with two-thirds of the region (West Wales 
and the Valleys) receiving the highest level of structural funding. Although the 
previous round of structural funding ended in 2013, West Wales and the Valleys 
has retained its status as one of the poorer regions of the EU and has again 
qualified for the highest level of support in the 2014-2020 phase. Wales is, and 
has often been, the poorest performing region in the UK in R&D terms, lagging 
behind most of the rest of the UK since 1995.  
 
Figure 1: Comparison of BERD spending in Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland (£m). 
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Source: StatsWales 
  
 
 
Figure 1 above illustrates the problem Wales had (and has) in terms of the 
innovative capacity of its private sector. Despite having twice the population of 
Northern Ireland, Welsh BERD was only marginally higher between 1995 and 
2001 and has since been overtaken. In addition, it remained significantly less 
than Scotland, which has a population of approximately twice that of Wales but 
three times the BERD spending. BERD is the most economically beneficial form 
of R&D by virtue of its stronger contribution to productivity growth than other 
R&D forms (Sveikauskas, 2007). Wales’ poor performance in this measure as 
compared with other devolved regions of the UK illustrates its weaker region 
status. A report by the NAfW Economic Development Committee identified this 
problem in 2002 shortly after the first Technium was opened (Jones-Evans, 
2002). 
 
The history of the Welsh economy is largely one of natural resources and heavy 
industry giving way to the manufacturing and service sectors in recent years. 
From the 1960s onwards, employment in the service sector grew with the 
establishment of important public sector institutions. Manufacturing became 
increasingly important during the post-war era, with a high degree of 
government support to attract industry to Wales (Johnes, 2012, p.250). More 
recently, foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an important source of jobs. 
In the 1980s, Wales gained three times the share of inward investment and 
associated jobs in the UK than would be expected based on its population with 
these firms attracted by a combination of government regional aid, 
  
infrastructure spending, and relatively low wages (Pickernell, 2011). Cooke 
(2003, p.4) agrees, stating that from 1983 to 1993 Wales consistently attracted 
between 15%-20% of inward investment in the UK despite having only 5% of 
the UK’s population. However, from 1998-2008, around 31,000 jobs were lost 
as companies moved to Central and Eastern Europe, China and South East 
Asia and to take advantage of lower labour costs, increasing education and 
skills levels, and growing markets (Evans et al. 2008). The policy discussed 
here, which sought to grow domestic firms, can be seen as a change of 
direction in Welsh policy which was ultimately unsuccessful, contributing to the 
trend recognised by Huggins and Pugh (2015) whereby the Welsh policy 
agenda has swung between different approaches over time lacking an 
overarching rationale.  
 
Role of the Welsh Government 
 
Since 1999, the Welsh Government has had the power to develop and 
implement its own policies in devolved areas such as economic development. 
When the National Assembly for Wales became operational, its elected 
government became responsible for developing economic policies within the 
context of central UK policy frameworks, giving policy-makers in Wales more 
autonomy than previously. However, the fiscal powers of the Welsh 
Government are limited as it has no major tax-raising powers and public finance 
continues to be provided via a block grant from UK central government. 
 
  
Although innovation falls under the Welsh Government’s remit, there are a 
number of programmes and funding sources (e.g. Innovation UK and NESTA) 
that are operated at a UK level. Kerton and Bright (2012) analysed the 
innovation support offered in Wales compared to the other parts of the UK and 
found that the breadth and types of innovation support offered to businesses 
are comparable to those of other regions. They also found some unique support 
for innovation funded by the Welsh European Funding Office (WEFO) which 
administers and monitors the Structural Funds that flow to Wales from Europe. 
The present approach to innovation at the European level is set out in the 
Innovation Union document where the key underlying principle is ‘smart 
specialisation’ where regions and nations build on their strengths rather than 
trying to compete with one another in the same few sectors (European 
Commission, 2010; 2011). This European approach is important in Wales not 
only in driving the direction of government policy but also in supporting 
innovation programmes and actions through structural funds where the aim is 
to strengthen economic and social cohesion in the European Union by 
correcting imbalances between its regions (European Commission, 2012). 
Table 1 below summarises the main innovation related policies enacted by the 
different Welsh administrations since 1993. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
West Wales and the Valleys has been eligible since 2000 for the highest level 
of funding based on its convergence status, receiving £1.2bn of European 
support in the period 2000-2006 under the Objective 1 programme, funds that 
  
were matched by the public, private and voluntary sectors. Of this, 
approximately £130m of grants was earmarked specifically for innovation 
interventions costing a total of £284m (Bristow and Jones-Evans, 2008). Thus, 
it is important to emphasize the role of European Funds in providing the finance 
for innovation policy support in Wales. These are distributed and managed 
through WEFO although ultimately, it is the Welsh Government that sets the 
policy direction within which innovation support is implemented.  
 
Performance of European Structural Funds in supporting innovation 
   
As Bristow and Jones-Evans (2008), and Rhisiart and Jones-Evans (2016) 
have discussed, one of the key priorities of the European Structural Funding 
programme in Wales for the period 2000-2006 was the development of 
innovation and the knowledge based economy. Two key measures were 
created to achieve this: Measure 2.3 (support for the development of innovation 
and research and development) that would help in developing clusters and new 
R&D potential around higher and further education institutions; and Measure 
2.4 that would focus on skills for innovation and technology. The performance 
data obtained from WEFO (Table 2) shows the outputs of activities and results 
for the 2000-2006 Objective 1 programme for West Wales and the Valleys as 
of July 2010. 
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It is noticeable that despite a key objective of the programme in terms of 
innovation being the diversification of the economic base by growing more 
technology and knowledge driven firms, the range of innovation projects funded 
failed to have any serious impact in terms of gross new companies in high 
technology sectors. Whereas the target for the programme was the creation of 
2,000 new firms only 456 (less than 25% of the target) were eventually started 
during this period. Part of this failure could be explained by the fact that of 105 
innovation projects under the Objective 1 programme, only 27 were tasked with 
achieving this result. Of these, nearly half were directly related to Technium. 
 
Technium Programme Performance 
 
The Technium programme was arguably the highest profile innovation 
intervention in Wales since devolution, featuring in every one of the Welsh 
Government’s changing economic strategies from 2000 until its eventual 
demise. It also represents a significant infrastructural investment of around 
£100m on ten physical centres with 89% of this coming from EU Structural 
Funds and public sector matched funds (DTZ, 2010, p. iv). Originally conceived 
by two Swansea-based academics and one policymaker (NAfW Enterprise and 
Learning Committee, 2008, pg. 26), Technium sought to provide office space 
and support for high technology firms to help them commercialise research and 
contribute to economic growth (Clement and Davies, 2002). It was especially 
aimed at university spin-offs and high technology firms, beginning as an 
alliance between Welsh universities and the Welsh Development Agency 
(WDA). It was then led by a consortium of the aforementioned alongside the 
  
City and County of Swansea, West Wales TEC, Business Connect and 
Swansea Institute of Higher Education (SIHE).  
 
According to Clement and Davies (2002), Technium was designed to bridge 
the gap between advanced University research and commercial exploitation 
and was designed with four key aims, namely (a) the construction of a high 
quality environment appropriate to facilitate and support the growth of 
knowledge driven businesses; (b) to accelerate the rate of increase of creation 
of new SMEs in the knowledge economy; (c) to support the growth of already 
existing knowledge driven SMEs; and (d) to create a "one-stop-shop" to 
encourage the relocation of inward investing R&D operations. Therefore, the 
rationale behind the programme was that the Higher Education Institutions 
(HEIs) could leverage their expertise in intellectual property (IP) alongside the 
WDA’s assets and expertise in physical property and business support in order 
to facilitate enhanced commercialisation of R&D activities in Wales.   
 
In theory, Technium was the operationalisation of the Triple Helix model of 
innovation with government in its various guises using European funds to 
facilitate increased engagement between business and academia to foster 
innovation in order to help grow the Welsh economy (Pugh, 2016). The 
programme has attracted a moderate interest amongst researchers and 
evaluators: it received positive analysis in a Regional Studies paper by 
academics who were themselves directly involved in developing Technium as 
it was still underway (Abbey et al., 2008), but was reviewed much less positively 
by evaluation consultants (DTZ, 2010) in a review commissioned by the Welsh 
  
administration. A recent paper used it as a comparative case study for exploring 
social capital and innovation, reflecting on the Technium experience and linking 
it to wider debates on the evolution of regional innovation policy in Europe, 
providing suggestions on how costly innovation policy mistakes can be avoided 
(Murphy et al., 2016).  
 
The first Technium in Swansea opened in 2001. A new Welsh regional 
innovation strategy was launched in 2002 with a nationwide Technium network 
at its heart, despite the fact that the NAfW Economic Development Committee 
published a report suggesting that the research base in Wales was, at the time, 
inadequate to support the knowledge economy aspirations of the strategy 
(Jones-Evans, 2002) and that Structural Funding should focus on developing 
research capacity rather than incubators. Nonetheless, this advice was ignored 
and Technium was subsequently expanded to twelve centres across Wales 
using European Structural Funds. The Techniums, rather than being based in 
the more prosperous parts of Wales, were located exclusively in the European 
Objective 1 area which is reflective of the European monies used to establish 
them. Furthermore, there was a demonstrable preference for a South West 
Wales location with six out of the ten Techniums located within a 25-mile radius 
of Swansea, the institutional location of two of the three individuals who 
originated the idea. The then Minister for the Economy and Transport 
responsible for the programme, Andrew Davies AM, was a champion of the 
Technium network and the political representative for Swansea West. Davies 
later blamed Welsh civil servants for the programme’s failure, commenting “I 
think the concept was very sound… It was the management and roll-out that 
  
was deficient”, a point that other politicians in Wales disagreed with (Evans 
2010).  
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Figure 2: Locations of individual Techniums in Wales 
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NB Areas shaded in grey are Objective 1. 
 
In total, Technium received 25% of the total amount allocated to innovation 
projects under measures 2.3 and 2.4 for the Welsh Objective 1 programme. 
The overall target for the Objective 1 programme was 2,000 new high 
technology firms, so it could reasonably have been expected the Techniums 
would create at least 500 of these given that it was the only dedicated 
programme focusing specifically on this target. However, expectations were 
downgraded quickly even before the Techniums were built with only 250 firms 
projected to be set up. 
 
As table 4 shows, even the re-profiled target of 133 firms was not reached and 
only 86 new high technology companies were actually created at an overall cost 
of £74m during the period 2003-2010 (just under £1m per company). In 
contrast, the Welsh Government’s Knowledge Exploitation Fund - established 
to encourage greater links between tertiary institutions and industry rather than 
  
to specifically create new firms – generated 239 new businesses at a cost of 
£20.3m – a tenth of the cost of the Technium programme. Further, Technium 
also did not reach its targets in increased turnover for supported firms (23% of 
original target achieved, 32% of reprofiled target); gross jobs safeguarded (47% 
of original target achieved, 67% of reprofiled target) and gross new jobs (35% 
of original target achieved, 509% of reprofiled target). Whilst the Techniums 
reported creating 808 gross new jobs in high technology sectors, this is still 
considerably below the 1,297 jobs that Davies and Abbey (2007) estimated 
would be created and lower than the 1,181 target for when all the centres were 
operational.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Within the previous evaluations of the Technium network conducted, a number 
of key points are worth summarising. Cooke (2003) didn’t see the Techniums 
as innovative, suggesting that they were simply properties leasing space and 
highlighting a number of ‘design flaws’ in the concept, predominantly the failure 
to prioritise management assistance through allocating space to firms providing 
venture capital, legal advice, and management accountancy support within the 
buildings. Cooke and Clifton (2006) considered the scheme as overambitious 
because it assumed that over 400 incubator spaces could be filled. This was 
despite evidence from Jones-Evans (2002) that calculated, using international 
rates of academic entrepreneurship, that only 20 to 30 staff spinouts could be 
anticipated from Welsh universities at the time of the programme. It also 
concluded that the buildings were not in themselves innovative but merely a 
  
replication of old incubation approaches with the result that the focus on 
management assistance and advice became lost. There were setbacks in 
rolling out Technium, with the Bio Technium and the Media Technium in 
Carmarthenshire both failing during the period 2003-2005. There was also 
concern expressed by independent Welsh Government advisers on the lack of 
output from the Techniums with a review of commercialisation activities in 
Wales warning that ‘the evidence suggests progress in meeting [the targets] 
has been mixed. One of the main reasons for this is the absence of a 
continuous pipeline of strong technology based tenant companies’ (Gibson 
Review, 2006, pg. 13). This echoed the earlier warnings from the 2002 NAfW 
report on R&D activities in Wales (Jones-Evans, 2002) and a number of WDA 
officials in private referred scathingly to the Techniums as ‘emptiums’ or 
‘desertiums’ (Evans, 2010; Morgan, 2012). 
 
Others disagreed with this view. For example, Bristow et. al. (2008) were more 
generous suggesting that whilst the cost per job seemed very high, the jobs 
tended to be graduate level, R&D based positions, and could form the basis for 
more high value added growth in the future. The most strident defence came, 
not unsurprisingly, from Abbey et. al, (2008) who argued that Cooke and 
Clifton’s criticisms were ‘unsubstantiated’ and that the research base of South 
West Wales was expected to ‘have almost tripled’ by the time the programme 
reached maturity. However, recent statistics released by the UK Office of 
National Statistics show that no such increase occurred in Wales and that the 
number of full time equivalents (FTEs) remained fairly constant at around 4000 
individuals engaged in BERD, the lowest in the UK as of 2013 (Office for 
  
National Statistics, 2014), suggesting that Cooke and Clifton’s early concerns 
were correct. 
 
The failure of the Technium network to make any significant impact on the 
innovation performance of the Welsh economy as predicted by Abbey et al. 
(2008) inevitably led to concerns about performance and on value for money. 
As a result, an officially commissioned evaluation in 2010 using unpublished 
official data from Objective 1 monitoring forms was carried out. This revealed 
that each job in the Techniums cost an average of £190,000 of public money, 
and occupancy rates at Technium Pembrokeshire were as low as 4% (DTZ, 
2010). Overall, the evaluation was highly critical of the programme and, in 
November 2010, the Welsh Government announced that it was closing the 
majority of the Techniums around Wales with only four remaining, and these 
were sold to local universities and councils in subsequent years (BBC, 2011).  
 
What went wrong? 
 
To understand Technium’s performance, we sought the view of key 
stakeholders, individuals from business, universities and policymakers to 
gather informed views on the programme. Interviews were undertaken with the 
wider intention of seeking to understand innovation policy measures within 
Wales more generally and the relevant Technium related comments were 
extracted from NVivo coded data. This section presents a selection of 
comments and observations from those interviewed blended with analysis of 
the programme. 
  
 
The stakeholders interviewed expressed a range of views on innovation in 
Wales, but were in relative agreement about the Technium programme: 
 
I don’t think the Techniums were particularly useful ... It’s easy to kick 
the Techniums I suppose. (University Professional 11) 
 
A common criticism made both by evaluators and stakeholders interviewed was 
the divergence between the original design and eventual implementation. 
Techniums were intended to be more than a property-based incubator 
approach with plans to provide advice and support for companies located within 
the buildings and links to Welsh universities so that businesses could access 
their knowledge and expertise. However, in line with many of the early criticisms 
of the project, these did not materialise with a lack of spin-outs coming from the 
universities to fill the incubator spaces. Consequently, the Technium 
programme was seen more as a continuation of the WDA’s property investment 
programmes of the past. 
 
Techniums were always about the property investment people in the old 
WDA, it was simply a way of continuing to build advance factories... If 
they could pick up on innovation and technology as the underpinning 
rationale they could go and build very nice high quality sheds in parts of 
Wales and call them Techniums. (University Professor D)  
 
  
According to this respondent, the underlying problem was that the people in 
charge of implementing the Technium roll-out fundamentally misunderstood the 
nature of an innovation programme and focussed on the property elements 
because that was where their expertise and experience lay. These insights 
provided by the interviewees broadly match those of the evaluations discussed 
above. Some respondents questioned the rationale and innovation credentials 
of Technium, seeing it as a continuation of the WDA’s property investment 
initiatives. Their insights question whether Technium really was an innovation 
programme despite the fact it certainly is presented as such in various policy 
documents and its original rationale fits the Triple Helix approach to innovation. 
The suggestion by a former WDA senior official that the Techniums weren’t 
‘proper’ innovation centres is tied to the lack of integration and embeddedness 
with other innovation supporting mechanisms, as well as the lack of demand 
from the private sector. Another observation was the manner in which the 
programme was expanded across the whole of Wales based on the perceived 
success of the first centre in Swansea. The Welsh Government’s official 
evaluation (DTZ, 2010) found no clear rationale for expansion beyond the first 
centre:  
 
Technium… basis of a very good idea. But we’ve had a tendency in 
Wales if something works well once then it will work ten times better if 
we have ten times as many, and it appears unfortunately that that wasn’t 
the case. (Senior Policymaker B)  
 
  
The expansion of the programme was problematic because of a mismatch 
between supply and demand, with too many Techniums and not enough 
businesses to fill them, a point highlighted by the NAfW Economic Development 
Committee report at the outset. The purported focus on softer support, such as 
management assistance and advice, was not realised: 
 
Shiny buildings where there is little capacity to use and exploit what the 
infrastructure provides, because there is either no demand, or little 
demand; it’s been seen as the end in itself rather than the means. 
(University Professor E) 
 
The locations of some of the Techniums, and links to European funding 
requirements, were problematic because there was little actual or identified 
demand for the service from businesses in the areas concerned.  
 
I think that model was flawed in so much as it was necessarily tagged to 
European funding, which is necessarily tagged to particular areas of 
Wales... There was no critical network around it in some areas. (Wales 
Director of Business Representative Organisation A)  
 
This issue of determining the location of programmes has been noted more 
widely across Europe, leading us to question how effective cross-regional 
policy learning is, and whether there are enough mechanisms to support this 
and avoid costly mistake-repetition. Rather, we see in Wales an example of 
  
what Morgan (2012) has recognised as ‘policy path-dependence’, which 
conditions future approaches based on what has come before. 
 
Wales is not alone in this. If you go around Europe there are many of 
these examples of effectively white elephants. (University Professor E)  
 
According to one policymaker involved in the Technium concept  
 
…the underlying rationale behind the Technium project is that they 
should be fully customer oriented, catering for the needs of companies 
in more ways than straightforward infrastructure provision. (Policymaker 
A) 
 
If Techniums were to be anything other than standard physical space for early 
stage companies, university involvement and the ‘value-added’ approach of 
linking into other infrastructural support was critical. Technium brought nothing 
new to the university-side of partnerships. Whilst emphasis was placed on them 
becoming financially self-sustaining, there was no parallel commitment to 
facilitate a sustainable commercialisation system by focusing on ‘softer’ 
measures of help for companies, for example encouraging academic 
engagement in entrepreneurial activities (Johnson, Monsen & MacKenzie, 
2017). Businesses assisted or created are ‘hard’ forms of support which are 
easily measured but offer little detail on the efficacy of support with no tracking 
of the companies, no detail on the type of support offered, and no assessment 
of how this helped businesses. The critical lesson here lies in policymakers and 
  
academics better understanding business demand for innovation support 
activities provided by the public sector (the lack of which was ignored for 
Technium) and the importance of ‘softer’ support. When empty spaces arose, 
the obvious decision for a loss-making entity was to attempt to lease it out, 
transforming the initiative from an innovation support policy to the Welsh 
Government effectively becoming a landlord. The lack of a parallel commitment 
to building absorptive capacity and innovation capabilities in the regional 
business population, as evidenced by Bristow and Jones-Evans (2008), led to 
a significant disconnect between supply and demand, undermining the efficacy 
of the programme.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This paper has presented a summary of the development and failure of an 
innovation policy intervention utilising EU Structural Funds. Questions remain 
as to why a policy decision was made to allocate a quarter of the overall budget 
for innovation policy under the Objective 1 programme to a concept that had 
not yet been fully evaluated, and surprise has been expressed over the lack of 
a public inquest into the ‘failure of an experiment that cost around £111m’ 
(Morgan, 2012, p.16). Despite the DTZ report, the Wales Audit Office refused 
to undertake a thorough review into the failure of the programme (WAO, 2011) 
and to examine whether the claims made by Abbey et al. (2008) actually 
represented value for money for the Welsh taxpayer. There is also little 
evidence of a learning process to feed back the lessons from the Technium 
experience into current and future plans under the developing smart 
  
specialisation programme. Whilst this paper takes a critical stance on the 
Technium programme, it is important recognise that it at least represented a 
break from past FDI-premised approaches, and that developing indigenous 
firms from the bottom up is an important part of a regional innovation strategy.  
 
The first mistake for the Technium programme was the lack of clear rationale 
for expansion beyond the first incubator in Swansea, especially as two had 
failed in quick succession after the first opened. Secondly, there were no explicit 
objectives for the Technium programme and it would seem that the only 
rationale was to build as many as possible before the European funding ran 
out. Certainly, there was little consideration of demand from the local business 
community or universities. Thirdly, the monitoring and evaluation by Technium 
managers was practically non-existent and this failure on the ground was not 
noticed by those higher up within the system (Jones-Evans, 2013). Occupancy 
rates in Techniums were low, and the provision of business support and its take 
up was minimal. Finally, whilst space within each property was targeted 
towards innovative businesses, there was no real support provided on site to 
the firms located there contrary to what is practiced within successful incubator 
programmes around the world where financial and management advice is as 
important as the physical space in which firms are based (Bergek and Norman, 
2008). Ironically, following the closure of the Technium programme, a number 
of the buildings are being managed as part of the property portfolios of local 
authorities and have subsequently attracted various companies as tenants 
(Wales Online, 2011). However, this owes more to the traditional economic 
development role of councils rather than the ‘Triple Helix interweaving of 
  
government, business and higher education strongly formalised within a single 
programme’ which, according to Abbey et al. (2008), characterised the failed 
Technium programme.  
 
The closeness of key academics to policymakers and their mutual interest in 
the creation of Technium combined to create a policy intervention that was 
destined to fail. This is a salutary lesson for other peripheral weaker EU regions 
– where there is no business demand for, or capacity to utilise, a particular form 
of policy support, the chances of it succeeding are severely limited. The 
construction of new buildings in itself cannot make an innovation system work 
effectively and they have to be appropriately matched with the private sector’s 
ability and desire to use them. The new policies implemented as part of the 
Lisbon Treaty and H2020 around smart, sustainable and inclusive growth need 
to engage with the stimulation of the private sector beyond the creation of 
physical infrastructure and consider the availability of finance, 
commercialisation training and, most importantly, the further development of 
human capital. Less developed regions suffer from deficiencies in these areas 
so need to be aware of the dangers of projecting modernity through the creation 
of ‘big shiny buildings’, tempting as they are. Unfortunately, lessons have not 
been learnt following the closure of Technium and other projects have repeated 
many of the mistakes. For example, High Performance Computing Wales (HPC 
Wales) was established in 2011 to provide a world-class supercomputer facility 
but failed to address demand in the market-place. It had a target of creating 
over 400 jobs and supporting 550 firms but created 170 jobs, assisted 247 
businesses and generated £3.7m into the Welsh economy at an overall cost of 
  
£33m (HPC Wales, 2015). Similar criticisms have also been recently levelled 
at the new Swansea Bay City Deal with projects (led by some of the same 
academics behind Technium and HPC Wales) again focusing on buildings 
rather than local business demand (Pyke and Youle, 2017). 
 
There is a key lesson from the Technium experience around the co-option of 
innovation policy to fit the agendas of strong regional players, particularly when 
a weak private sector is present. This could be especially the case in small 
tightly networked peripheral regions or nations such as Wales where strong 
individual actors can influence policy decisions regardless of demand. To 
counter this, a better understanding of business need for innovation support 
could be gleaned from surveys such as the Community Innovation Survey or 
working more closely with business groups (such as the Federation for Small 
Business in the UK) to understand where policy could make a better 
contribution to innovation. This would increase effectiveness of such policies 
by being demand-led and without significantly increasing transaction or 
opportunity costs. Such an approach would facilitate the integration and place-
based economic transformation that Smart Specialisation strategies seek to 
create, especially in supporting the further development of a competitive SME 
sector (European Commission, 2013; McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2015; 
2016). More crucially, it would also help in identifying areas where there are 
strengths and weaknesses, thus recognising the importance of listening to the 
business community at which the policies are directed, and being able to 
benchmark against previous policies and changes in opinion. 
 
  
In addition to lessons in the design and implementation of innovation policies, 
this paper provides a number of insights into debates on wider regional 
innovation policy theory. Firstly, the Technium story crystalises the problems of 
over-supply without addressing the issue of demand amongst the local 
business community. Secondly, a focus on local specificities and of the existing 
networks and cultures within which an intervention sits is key if we are to avoid 
placing innovation interventions in inappropriate locations. Thirdly, as our 
analysis is on the effects of a policy over time, it contributes to the literature on 
innovation policies which tend to take cross-sectional snapshots (Roper et al., 
2006), which are often considered misleading (Salter and Martin, 2001; Brown, 
Gregson and Mason, 2016) and negates the detail of how policies are 
formulated, operated and, in this case, abandoned over time (Bergek et al., 
2008). A better understanding of efficacious policy mixes requires analysing the 
temporal and contextual aspects of how they are created and undertaken 
(Perchard, MacKenzie, Decker and Favero, 2017). Achieving the right “policy 
mix” is recognised as a key element for innovation policy in the era of smart 
specialisation (cf. Flanagan, Uyarra and Laranja, 2011). We have sought to do 
this by assessing the Technium policy as situated within the wider Welsh and 
EU contexts in order to illustrate what policy makers actually do (Uyarra and 
Flanagan, 2010; Arshed, Mason and Carter, 2016).  
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Table 1: Timeline of Welsh Innovation Policy 
 
Year Policy/ Event Details  
1993-4 RTP (later RIS) 
pilot 
Wales is one of the first regions to implement 
Regional Technology Plans - an early European 
regional innovation policy  
1999 
 
Devolution Powers devolved to Wales from the UK including 
innovation and economic development 
2001 Technium Inception First centre is opened in Swansea 
2002 Expansion 
announced 
Decision made to create five more centres.  
2002 A Winning Wales 
and Wales for 
Innovation 
Published 
The first economic and innovation strategies 
published by the Welsh Government. Led to £150 
expansion of the programme in 2003.  
2004 Knowledge 
Economy Nexus 
published 
This policy emphasises the roles of universities as 
economic drivers through programmes such as 
Technium.  
2005 Wales: A Vibrant 
Economy Published 
The next Welsh economic strategy, with 
Techniums as a focal point.  
2006 Science Policy for 
Wales published 
Again, the focus on driving innovation through 
knowledge with Techniums as a feature.  
2008 Assembly’s Internal 
Audit Service 
publishes critical 
report 
Welsh Government responds to this by announcing 
further funding for the programme.  
2009 £17 million ERDF 
funding allocated to 
programme 
This was announced in response to the critical IAS 
report.  
2010 Six Techniums 
closed following 
policy review 
Pembrokeshire, Baglan, Llanelli, Pencoed, 
Aberystwyth, and Bangor Techniums closed. The 
reason being the high costs.  
2010 Economic Renewal: 
A New Direction 
published 
The economic policy, which takes a sector based 
approach to economic development. Techniums 
are aligned to sectors.  
2010 DTZ report The report is critical with the programme and 
underlines a number of shortcomings.  
2013 Innovation for 
Wales 
The latest innovation policy is sector based to align 
with the smart specialisation requirements pushed 
from Europe.  
 
  
Table 2: Innovation activities and results from the Objective 1 programme, West Wales 
and the Valleys, 2000-2006 
 
Measure Output PC Target 
Forecast Actual 
No 
% of 
PC 
target 
No 
% of 
PC 
target 
Activities       
2.4 No of employees helped 15,000 8,112 54% 7,146 48% 
 
Companies assisted 
of which: 5,000 17,538 100+% 20,901 100+% 
2.3 
Companies receiving 
advice on innovation and 
R&D 2,000 13,929 100+% 17,328 100+% 
2.4 No. of companies helped 3,000 3,609 100+% 3,573 100+% 
Results       
 
Gross new jobs 
of which: 8,000 6,830 85% 8,157 100+% 
2.3 Gross new jobs 5,000 2,599 52% 4,466 89% 
2.3 Gross new indirect jobs - 1,657 - 1,314 - 
2.3 
Gross new jobs in high-
tech sectors 3,000 2,574 86% 2,377 79% 
 
Gross safeguarded jobs 
of which: 7,830 12,631 100+% 22,413 100+% 
2.3 
Gross new jobs 
safeguarded 7,230 11,861 100+% 22,276 100+% 
2.4 
Gross new jobs 
safeguarded through ESF 
support 600 770 100+% 137 23% 
2.3 
Gross new companies in 
high-tech sectors 2,000 504 25% 456 23% 
Source: WEFO data release 31/07/2010 
  
  
 
Table 3: Technium Centres funded by European Structural funding (2001-2007) 
 
Map 
No. 
Year 
Opened 
 
Technium+ 
 
Town/City 
 
Region 
 
Sector Focus 
 
1 2001 Technium 1 Swansea SW Wales None 
 
2 2003 Digital Swansea SW Wales 
Digital and Software 
Technologies 
3 2004 Technium 2 Swansea SW Wales None 
4 2004 OpTIC St Asaph N Wales Opto-electronic 
 
 
5 
2004 Aberystwyth Aberystwyth Mid Wales 
Bio- Environmental 
and Computing 
Sciences Digital 
Tech 
6 
2005 Digital@Sony* Pencoed SE Wales 
Tech-based 
incubation 
 
7 2005 
Sustainable 
Technologies Baglan SW Wales 
Sustainable Tech 
and Low Carbon 
8 2005 CAST Bangor N Wales Advanced Software 
 
9 2007 
Performance 
Engineering Llanelli SW Wales Engineering 
 
10 2007 Pembrokeshire 
Pembroke 
Dock SW Wales 
Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy 
Adapted from DTZ Evaluation of the Technium Programme 2010. 
*Digital@Sony Technium did not receive any European funds 
+Both the Media Techniums and the Biotechnium in Carmarthenshire were closed in 
2003 and 2005 respectively. 
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Table 4: Objective 1 Funded Techniums - Results Targets and Outputs 
 
 Target Reprofile Achieved 
% achieved 
of Original 
Target 
of Reprofiled 
Target 
Increase in turnover in 
supported companies 
£111.71m £81.57m £26.04m 23.31 31.92 
Gross new companies 
in high tech sectors  
250 133 86 34.40 64.66 
Gross jobs 
safeguarded  
850 600 399 46.94 66.50 
Gross new jobs  503 35 178 35.39 508.57 
Gross new jobs in high 
tech sectors  
1181 789 808 68.42 102.41 
Number of new 
patents and 
trademarks 
54 54 79 146.30 146.30 
Number of jobs 
accommodated 
directly  
188 188 188 100 100 
Number of gross new 
indirect jobs  
0 318 616  N/A 193.71 
Source: DTZ: Techniums Objective 1 Application Forms 
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